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WHO DISCIPLINES THE CFO? AN ASSESSMENT OF STAKEHOLDER POWER 
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract 
We analyze the respective influence of employee and shareholder interests on the dismissal of 
89 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) of major German companies between 1999 and 2006. 
Drawing on stakeholder-agency theory, we argue that employees wield sufficient power to 
affect executive replacements. We show that the provision of job security as a proxy for 
employee interests has a significant effect on the likelihood of CFO dismissal. This effect is 
independent of the fulfillment of shareholders’ objectives. We conclude that stakeholder 
groups beyond shareholders exert influence on corporate governance. We argue that 
executives need to respond to several stakeholder groups simultaneously. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
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A major focus of the established corporate governance literature lies on the potential agency 
conflicts between management and shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In contrast, this literature has devoted only little attention to 
the notion that in their decision-making, top managers might have to consider the claims of 
stakeholder groups other than shareholders. Stakeholder-agency theory (Hill & Jones, 1992), 
drawing on resource dependency theory (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), suggests that those 
groups of stakeholders who have the power to provide or withhold resources effectively exert 
some control over the firm’s management, regardless of whether they share in ownership 
rights. Authors like Gollan & Patmore (2002) and Pfeffer (2007) argue that employees in 
particular have considerable means to push for the pursuit of their own interests at firm level, 
as human and social capital usually represent critical resources. Moreover, legitimacy theory 
(Suchman, 1995) suggests that employees hold power through their ability to influence the 
firm's perceived legitimacy in the outside community.  
The corporate governance literature regards dismissal as the ultimate device to discipline top 
management (Bushman & Smith, 2001; Menon & Williams, 2008; Volpin, 2002). Several 
authors have shown that this sanction works effectively i.e., that a firm’s underperformance 
raises the likelihood for members of the firm’s top management to be fired (Fee & Hadlock, 
2004; Mian, 2001). In addition, its political and symbolic significance makes the replacement 
of an executive an attractive subject for stakeholder influence as well as a suitable means for 
governance bodies to signal responsiveness to these groups. If stakeholder power actually 
exists for employees as suggested by stakeholder-agency theory, we should expect top 
management dismissals to take place not only if the firm’s performance is below the 
expectations of shareholders, but also in those situations where the firm fails to fulfill central 
expectations of employees. However, little evidence exists on how far the employees' power 
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base reaches, and, in particular, whether they can actually affect top management turnover 
decisions (Rock & Wachter, 1999; Schneper & Guillén, 2004). 
In this paper, we explore the importance of shareholders’ and employees’ voice in driving the 
replacement of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in large corporations in Germany. We choose 
the CFO position as the object of our analysis for two reasons. First, this position is 
substantially affected by potential conflicts of interests between shareholders and other 
stakeholder groups. CFOs are widely seen as key representatives of shareholder interests 
(Mian, 2001; Zorn, 2004). Moreover, the CFO's "primary responsibility for the management 
of the financial system" (Mian, 2001, p. 145; see also Zorn & Dobbin, 2003) includes power 
over policies that significantly affect employees e.g., cost cutting decisions. Second, due to 
the increased importance attached to CFOs, recent publications explicitly encourage further 
CFO-related research (Baxter & Chua, 2008; Chua, 2007; Geiger & North, 2006). We 
contribute to filling this research gap.  
Our analysis shows that the question of whether a firm satisfies employee interests – 
independent of whether it also satisfies shareholder interests – significantly affects the 
likelihood of CFO dismissals. Therefore, we suggest that, at least in the German corporate 
governance context, the CFO needs to balance the objectives of both stakeholder groups. Our 
analysis casts doubt on the perspective that top managers are the agents of shareholders only 
(Denis & McConnell, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In contrast, we argue that in order to 
avoid sanctions, top managers need to be responsive to the interests of several parties 
simultaneously, regardless of whether these carry ownership rights in the formal sense. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we review the existing literature 
and derive our research questions. Thereafter, we provide an overview of our data, measures, 
and statistical methods, followed by our presentation of the results. Finally, we summarize the 
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main findings and discuss their implications for theory and managerial practice. We also 
identify the limitations of the study and suggest avenues for future research. 
REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
The Importance of Stakeholders in the Governance Decisions of Firms 
The established economics and finance literature largely considers corporate governance to be 
an instrument in the hands of the shareholders to supervise, steer, and discipline managers 
(Denis & McConnell, 2003; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In 
contrast, the stakeholder-agency perspective suggests that stakeholder groups 2  other than 
shareholders may also exert an indirect or even a direct influence on critical corporate 
governance decisions (Hill & Jones, 1992). Drawing on resource dependency theory, 
stakeholder-agency theory assumes "unequal resource dependencies (…) between managers 
and stakeholders" (Hill & Jones, 1992, p. 152) that provide the latter party with power over 
the former (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). It argues that the influence of stakeholder groups on 
corporate governance decisions is based on their ability to temporarily or permanently 
withdraw critical resources from the firm. Whether a resource is critical depends on the firm’s 
ability to continue functioning in the absence of that resource (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
According to this perspective, the more critical a stakeholder group’s contribution to the firm, 
the greater is its voice in the firm's governance (Hill & Jones, 1992). Coff (1999)'s 
interpretation of the resource-based view of the firm follows a similar reasoning arguing that 
stakeholders, being providers of (critical) resources to a firm, hold bargaining power enabling 
them to influence decisions in their favor. 
Similarly, legitimacy theory suggests that stakeholder groups other than shareholders may 
influence corporate decision-making to the extent that they affect the perception of the 
                                                 
2 According to Freeman (1984), a firm's stakeholders include any "group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (p. 46). 
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company by other parties (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995). Drawing on resource 
dependency theory, legitimacy theory proposes that a company needs to be perceived by its 
environment as being legitimate in order to persist (Parsons, 1960) and grow (Rao, Chandy, & 
Prabhu, 2008). Defined as the perceived congruence between an organization's behaviors and 
the shared beliefs or values of its environment, legitimacy constitutes a critical resource for 
the firm (Suchman, 1995). Its actions have to be perceived as "desirable, proper, and 
appropriate" (Suchman, 1995, p. 574) for the company to be able to sell its output and attract 
new resources. Given their direct relationship with the firm, key stakeholders act as 
multipliers able to affect the firm's perceived legitimacy in the respective community. In this 
situation, the firm needs to shape its actions in such a way as to be perceived responsive to 
these stakeholders. Therefore, legitimacy theory proposes that the objectives of a particular 
stakeholder group might affect firm decisions even without any form of action being taken by 
this group or its direct involvement in governance decisions. Suchman (1995) argues that 
governance bodies have incentives to anticipate the interests of a specific stakeholder group 
and to make decisions accordingly, in order to preserve legitimacy in the respective group as 
well as in the community influenced by it. 
There is widespread support for the proposition that, apart from shareholders, employees 
represent a particularly important group among a firm's stakeholders (Lopez-Cabrales, Valle 
& Herrero, 2006), given their lasting and intense relationship with the firm (Aoki, 1984; 
Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Rock & Wachter (1999) argue that employees provide a critical 
resource to firms, which significantly affects their competitive position, in particular in 
knowledge-intensive industries (Gollan & Patmore, 2002; Pfeffer, 2007). Coff (1999) 
compares the provision of human and social capital by employees (e.g., Burt, 1997) to the 
provision of financial capital by shareholders, arguing that both parties have similar levels of 
bargaining power arising from their respective ability to withdraw the resource concerned. 
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Moreover, employees represent a strong source of legitimacy for a firm, as their relatively 
large number (e.g., as compared to suppliers of intermediate inputs) provides them with 
multiple contact points to other relevant constituencies in the firm’s environment such as 
customers or potential new recruits. By influencing the firm's legitimacy as perceived by these 
parties, employees affect their company's competitive position above and beyond their roles 
as providers of knowledge and labor. This argument is independent of widespread normative 
claims for workforce participation (Fauver & Fuerst, 2006; Schneper & Guillén, 2004) and 
employees’ official representation in governance bodies, which varies significantly between 
countries, as the comparative industrial relations literature attests (e.g., Edwards, 2004; 
Gospel & Pendleton, 2005; Kaufman, 2004; Weil, 2005). 
Despite the widespread consensus on the importance of employees as a stakeholder group, 
there is little empirical evidence on whether the extent to which a firm satisfies the objectives 
of employees influences its governance decisions. The objectives of employees may or may 
not be consistent with those of other stakeholders. If firms attribute priority to the interests of 
employees, we would expect that these interests rank highly in management’s decision-
making criteria – and that failure to satisfy these objectives is followed by appropriate 
sanctions – even if the pursuit of these interests may run counter to the fulfillment of the 
objectives of other stakeholder groups, such as shareholders. The economics and finance 
literature considers shareholder value maximization as the "unitary goal" (Boatright, 2004, p. 
8), or at least the dominating interest, of shareholders (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Raman, 2005; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). In contrast, employee interests are often 
summarized as "higher wages, promotions, and greater job security" (Rock & Wachter, 1999, 
p. 122). Efficiency-driven headcount reductions, which firms often try to justify by the need 
to enhance shareholder value, constitute a particularly salient example of a firm’s decision to 
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put the interests of one stakeholder group before those of others (Franks & Mayer, 1998; 
Schneper & Guillén, 2004). 
Top management replacement as a governance device 
According to Pfeffer & Salancik (1978), the forced replacement of executives represents an 
ideal context for analyzing the extent to which alternative stakeholder groups, on the basis of 
their discretion over critical resources, are able to influence a firm’s governance. They argue 
that "[…] power will be used to influence the choice of top administrative personnel" (Pfeffer 
& Salancik 1978, p. 236; see also Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974; 1977). Among the various 
disciplinary options offered by corporate governance – which aims to protect the interests of 
all stakeholders in the firm (Aivazian, Ge, & Qiu, 2005) – executive dismissal constitutes the 
"ultimate element of an error-correcting process" (Renneboog & Trojanowski, 2002, p. 4). 
Legitimacy theory refers to executive turnover as a – partly symbolic – decision taken in order 
to (preemptively) address the interests of a specific stakeholder group, and, thus, to preserve 
legitimacy among the members of this group. An executive might even be dismissed as a 
scapegoat to relieve pressure on the firm caused by dissatisfaction of a particular interest 
group (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995).  
Over the past few years, the issue of executive replacement has gained increasing attention 
from practitioners and management theorists alike. CEO turnover rates in Europe have 
increased since the mid-1990s and have, in 2007, even exceeded the comparable rate in North 
America (Karlsson, Neilson, & Webster, 2008). This development includes both dismissals 
and cases of executive turnover not induced by corporate governance, e.g., orderly retirements 
or voluntary resignations. However, a research setting analyzing the stakeholder influence on 
executive turnover – via corporate governance mechanisms – needs to clearly distinguish 
between turnover events that are of disciplinary nature and those that are not. Only dismissals 
represent clear disciplinary action taken by the governance bodies of the firm concerned (e.g., 
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its supervisory board in countries with a dual board structure) on behalf of the relevant 
stakeholder groups (Aivazian et al. 2005; Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997; Denis & McConnell, 
2003). 
We argue that the CFO role constitutes a particularly salient executive position in order to 
study the strength of alternative stakeholder groups in affecting their firm’s governance 
decisions. On the one hand, the CFO is widely seen as the primary advocate of shareholder 
interests, especially as his or her function includes responsibility for investor relations 
(Deloitte Consulting, 2003; Mercer & Russell Reynolds Associates, 2006) and supervisory 
board communication (McKinsey, 2008). The responsibility for these tasks has substantially 
raised the importance of the CFO in recent years (Zorn, 2004). CFOs have developed "from 
bean counters to spin doctors" (Zorn, 2004, p. 345) as companies have become increasingly 
oriented towards the financial markets. As a result of their increased importance and ability to 
influence company performance, CFOs are frequently penalized for poor results (Menon & 
Williams, 2008). Therefore, shareholders have a substantial interest in the choice or 
replacement of these executives. 
On the other hand, the CFO's "primary responsibility for the management of the financial 
system" (Mian, 2001, p. 145; see also Geiger & North, 2006; Zorn, 2004; Zorn & Dobbin, 
2003) also includes authority over decisions that significantly affect employees. CFOs take 
direct responsibility for decisions that may materially affect the interests of employees e.g., 
decisions regarding staff costs and headcount reductions (Baxter & Chua, 2008). More 
generally, employees have an interest in ensuring that shareholders do not appropriate an 
excessively large share of the income generated by the firm (Coff, 1999). They should try to 
enforce this interest in particular in situations where the total income available for 
appropriation by the various stakeholder groups is comparatively small. In these situations, 
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employees should be particularly motivated to ensure that the CFO considers their objectives 
in the allocation of the firm’s returns, rather than to act on behalf of shareholders only.  
The recent case of Austrian Airlines CFO Thomas Kleibl illustrates this reasoning. During his 
tenure as CFO from 2001 to 2008, Kleibl implemented an austerity policy that met with 
financial success, and was widely approved by shareholders. At the same time, this policy led 
to increasing confrontation with employees, which culminated in the preemptive resignation 
by Kleibl from his position in March 2008, following massive pressure from the workers' 
council (APA, 2008; Wirtschaftsblatt, 2008). 
Extant literature provides ample empirical evidence for a negative relationship between firm 
performance and CEO turnover (Bresser, Valle Thiele, Biedermann, & Lüdeke, 2005; 
Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Kim, 1996; Warner, Watts, & Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 1988). 
Several authors show that firms that fail to satisfy the expectations of shareholders are more 
likely to replace their CEOs than firms that generate higher shareholder returns (Denis et al., 
1997; Fee & Hadlock, 2004; Huson, Malatesta, & Parrino, 2004). Fee & Hadlock (2004) 
report that this finding extends to non-CEO executives as well, however, without making 
specific statements regarding particular management roles or positions. Mian (2001) was the 
first to investigate the antecedents of CFO turnover, finding a significant negative relationship 
between stock market performance and CFO replacement for a large sample of U.S. 
companies. However, to the best of our knowledge, no empirical evidence has been produced 
so far on the extent to which employee interests – in absolute terms and relative to the 
interests of shareholders – affect the choice and replacement of a firm’s top managers in 
general, and of its CFOs in particular.  
To summarize our argument above, we expect that the extent to which a firm satisfies the 
interests of shareholders negatively affects the likelihood of the subsequent dismissal of the 
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firm’s CFO (H1). However, we also expect this relationship to hold true with respect to the 
extent to which the firm satisfies the interests of employees (H2).  
H1: A significant negative relationship exists between the satisfaction of shareholder 
interests and the likelihood of subsequent CFO dismissal. 
H2: A significant negative relationship exists between the satisfaction of employee interests 
and the likelihood of subsequent CFO dismissal. 
Furthermore, we are interested in whether the hypothesized effects between the satisfaction of 
shareholder and employee interests, respectively, and the likelihood of subsequent CFO 
dismissal are contingent on one another, and whether these effects are mutually reinforcing. 
As the objectives of shareholders and employees are not necessarily aligned (Coff, 1999; 
Schneper & Guillén, 2004), the interests of one group can be fulfilled independent from the 
interests of the other group. We expect both parties to exert direct or indirect pressure when 
their respective interests are not satisfied. Hence each party should be able to affect the 
likelihood of CFO dismissal independent from the other one. Thus, hypothesis H3 is as 
follows: 
H3: The negative relationship between the satisfaction of the interests of one party 
(shareholders or employees) and the likelihood of subsequent CFO dismissal exists 
irrespective of whether the interests of the other party are satisfied.  
In addition, if a firm fails to satisfy the interests of both shareholders and employees, we 
would expect the hypothesized negative effects on the likelihood of CFO dismissal to 
reinforce one another. While the governance body of the firm concerned might be able to 
oppose a claim from one important stakeholder group, it will face a much harder case if the 
two groups raise the same claim. Analytically speaking, we expect the effect of the 
satisfaction of shareholder interests on the likelihood of CFO dismissal to complement the 
effect of the satisfaction of employee interests. Complementarities exist where the marginal 
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effects of one variable increase in the level of another variable (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990 and 
1995; Milgrom, Qian, & Roberts, 1991). In our context, complementarity would exist if the 
effect of the satisfaction of employee interests on CFO dismissal was stronger when 
shareholder interests were unsatisfied as well (and vice versa). 
H4: The respective negative effects of insufficiently fulfilled shareholder and employee 
interests on the likelihood of subsequent CFO dismissal are complementary to one 
another. 
While our reasoning allows us to develop hypotheses (H3 and H4) on whether the effects of 
unsatisfied shareholder and employee interests on CFO replacement are related to one another, 
it does not give us any indication on how strong these two effects are relative to each other. In 
our empirical work we explore the respective effect sizes of the extent to which shareholder 
and employee interests are being fulfilled on the likelihood of CFO dismissal. 
METHODS 
Sample selection and data base 
We based our analysis on the 121 non-financial services (Mian, 2001) firms that were listed 
for at least one full year in the German DAX or MDAX indices (which, together, comprise 
the 80 largest prime standard companies in terms of market capitalization) between 1998 and 
2006. For these firms, we included all years of listing on the stock exchange in which there 
was no IPO, delisting, merger, or bankruptcy, leading to a total of 868 company years in our 
sample. We drew financial data on these firms from the Thomson ONE Banker, Amadeus, 
and Datastream databases. The number of company years in our sample diminished to 797 
because of missing data in at least one of these sources. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics 
of the overall sample as well as the firm years with CFO turnover events. 
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Insert Table 1 here 
We classified as CFO turnover cases all changes in the CFO position for the above sample 
that occurred in the relevant time frame.3 By comparing the names and roles of the top 
executives in the yearly firm profiles from the Hoppenstedt corporate database, we identified 
all cases in which there was a change in the CFO position. Following Mian (2001), we 
defined the CFO as the most senior executive in charge of Investor Relations – independent of 
his or her hierarchical rank and further responsibilities. The overall number of turnover cases 
in our sample was 156. By adjusting for double replacements within one year and cases 
coinciding with IPO, delisting, merger, or bankruptcy, we excluded 30 turnover cases. We 
furthermore excluded another seven cases, where the CFO position was newly created or had 
been vacant before i.e., there was no outgoing CFO. Consequently, 119 turnover cases 
remained. 
Following Huson et al. (2004) and Schrader & Lüthje (1995), we conducted an extensive 
press research to distinguish between three types of CFO turnover cases: dismissals, routine 
turnover cases and a residual category, “cases with other reasons for turnover”. We classified 
CFO replacements as dismissal if press articles provided a clear indication that the respective 
CFO had been asked to leave the position on the initiative of the executive or supervisory 
board, for example following open criticism of his or her work or differences concerning 
matters of corporate policy. We classified turnover cases as routine if our press research 
provided clear indication for an age- or health-related cause. Turnover events in our third, 
residual category resulted from different reasons. First, there were some cases where the old 
CFO had voluntarily resigned, e.g. to accept a different job. Second, this group might as well 
have included cases where CFOs stepped down seemingly voluntarily in order to preempt 
being fired. Of the 119 replacement cases in our sample, we classified 33 (28%) as forced 
                                                 
3 The relevant time frame for turnover cases was 1999-2006, as we needed data from two consecutive years to 
identify CFO turnover. 
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replacements, 30 (25%) as routine and 56 (47%) as other. We report the distribution of the 
119 turnover cases across years of investigation and across industries in Table 2. As our study 
focuses on stakeholder influence on forced CFO replacement as a governance decision, the 
majority of our analyses involved our sample of dismissal cases only. 
Insert Table 2 here 
The temporal distribution of turnover cases across years was relatively even with slightly 
fewer cases (11) in 2001 and 2004 and a peak in 1999 (20 cases). We did not find any strong 
evidence of disproportionate industry representation, as CFO turnover rates did not vary 
significantly across industries.  
Measures 
Following other studies on the antecedents of executive turnover (Mian, 2001; Huson et al., 
2004, Denis et al., 1997; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995), we used the yearly industry-adjusted 
total return to shareholders (RTS) as a proxy for the extent to which a firm satisfied the 
interests of its shareholders. We calculated RTS as the relative change in the company's total 
return index compared to the preceding year (Fee & Hadlock 2004). The definition of a 
company’s total return index takes into account both the change in stock price and dividends 
paid, and it is adjusted for potential stock splits in the year concerned. To determine industry-
adjusted RTS, we subtracted from a firm's RTS the same-year average RTS of all companies in 
the sample belonging to the same industry, using the ICB industry classification (Weisbach, 
1988; Warner et al., 1988).4 
Extant literature provides little guidance on which measures to use in order to capture the 
extent to which a firm fulfills the interests of its employees. We followed Blair & Roe (1999) 
                                                 
4 We also experimented with index-adjusted RTS by subtracting from a firm's RTS the average performance of all 
companies in the sample that belong to the same stock market index. As the results for this measure were 
broadly consistent with the results for industry-adjusted RTS, we only report our findings with respect to the 
latter measure, following established practice (Fee & Hadlock, 2004; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995).  
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who characterize employee satisfaction as a function of job security and wage levels (see also 
Rynes, Gerhart & Minette, 2004). Due to its fundamental importance and easy observability, 
we focused specifically on job security. Therefore, we used a firm’s headcount development – 
defined as the firm’s aggregate headcount in a particular year divided by its headcount in the 
previous year 5  – as a proxy for the extent to which employee interests are satisfied. 
Reductions in a firm’s workforce tend to attract considerable public attention (more than 
changes in aggregate compensation levels paid to employees) and can easily affect the firm’s 
perceived legitimacy (Schneper & Guillén, 2004). Particularly in countries with a stakeholder-
centered legislation, like Germany, the public tends to expect large corporations to put 
employment stability ahead of the pursuit of financial objectives (Rock & Wachter, 1999; Roe, 
2000). 
As the dependent variable in our multivariate analyses, we employed a binary measure CFO 
dismissal that took the value of 1 if the CFO was forced to leave the company in a particular 
year. We further included several control variables. As firm-specific control variables, we 
used firm size, measured by the log of total assets (Volpin, 2002; Dahya, Lonie, & Power, 
1998; Denis et al., 1997), share of institutional ownership (Dahya et al., 1998; Denis et al., 
1997), debt-to-equity ratio (Renneboog & Trojanowski, 2002), and the dummy variable 
finance capturing significant changes in a firm’s structure through capital increases or 
increases in long-term debt (Geiger & North, 2006; Ashbaugh, LaFond, & Mayhew, 2004). 
Moreover, we controlled for CFO age, as the literature on executive demographics suggests a 
considerable effect of age on turnover probability even beyond orderly retirement (Coughlan 
& Schmidt, 1985; Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995; Veiga, 1983). Finally, 
                                                 
5 We also compiled data on domestic headcount development, as the majority of employee representatives in the 
companies in our sample were located in Germany, and German trade unions might gear their claims primarily 
to the domestic staff (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 1996; Schneper & Guillén, 2004). However, we do not 
report our findings on this measure, as the results were essentially unaffected by whether we used total or 
domestic headcount figures.  
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in line with previous studies on executive turnover, we included dummy variables for each 
calendar year in order to control for one-time effects (Fee & Hadlock, 2004; Volpin, 2002). 
Analytical Methods 
In order to test hypotheses H1 and H2, we conducted several types of analyses. First, in line 
with other literature on executive turnover, we carried out univariate control group 
comparisons (Fauver & Fuerst, 2006; Fee & Hadlock, 2004; Volpin, 2002). To this end, we 
categorized all company years along the two dimensions calendar year and industry and 
assigned them to either test or control group (i.e., all years unaffected by CFO turnover). Then 
we matched each test group company year to the control group average for the respective 
industry and calendar year. In order to compare mean and median of our key variables 
between test and control group, we applied t-tests and Wilcoxon Sign-Rank tests, respectively. 
We conducted two separate analyses to independently test for the respective effects of RTS 
and headcount development one year (t-1) and two years (t-2) before the turnover event.6 
Second, we conducted univariate analyses to calculate turnover frequencies in relation to each 
one of our independent variables. Separately for each measure and for t-1 and t-2, we divided 
our total sample of CFO dismissal events into two subsamples based on whether the interests 
of the respective stakeholder groups were fulfilled or not. With respect to the interests of 
shareholders, we split the sample into a group of companies with negative industry-adjusted 
shareholder returns (RTSneg) and a group of companies with positive RTS (RTSpos). 
Similarly, with respect to the interests of employees, we divided our total sample into a group 
of companies with negative (HDneg) and those with positive headcount development 
(HDpos). We then used chi-square tests to compare the observed turnover frequencies in 
groups HDneg and HDpos and in groups RTSneg and RTSpos with the respective expected 
                                                 
6 Across analyses, we do not analyze the year of CFO turnover itself, i.e., t0. This happens for the following 
reasons: first, our data refers to year-end results, and, thus, t0, in most cases, involves effects that happened after 
the actual turnover event. Second, the dates of turnover disperse throughout the year and, consequently, the 
effect of our measures in t0 on the turnover event is incomparable across firms. 
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CFO dismissal frequencies. We calculated the expected number of CFO dismissals by 
multiplying the average CFO dismissal rate from the total sample with the number of firm 
years in each subsample. 
In order to test hypothesis H3, we extended the above analysis by constructing a 2x2-matrix 
combining the two dimensions RTS and headcount development. Each quadrant in this matrix 
represented one of the following subgroups: HDposRTSpos contained all firm years where 
both headcount development and RTS were positive; in HDnegRTSpos, headcount 
development was negative and RTS was positive; in HDposRTSneg, headcount development 
was positive and RTS was negative; and in HDnegRTSneg, both headcount development and 
RTS were negative. This approach enabled us to compare CFO dismissal frequencies across 
scenarios where stakeholder interests were fulfilled to different extents. We performed 
Fisher's exact test on the dismissal frequencies of the four quadrants to test whether their 
distribution suggested a dependency between the two dimensions RTS and headcount 
development.  
Finally, to test hypothesis H4, we used the inequality proposed by Cassiman & Veugelers 
(2006), which must hold if complementarity exists: 
)()()()( RTSposposHDTFRTSnegposHDTFRTSposnegHDTFnegRTSposHDTF −≥− (1)
where TF(X) denotes the CFO dismissal frequency in quadrant X and X refers to the groups 
defined above. While we could calculate the inequality with the average dismissal frequencies 
from the 2x2-matrix, this procedure did not allow us to test whether the results were 
statistically significant. In order to overcome this problem, we used bootstrapping to derive 
the distribution of the difference of the four dismissal frequencies, and subsequently applied a 
t-test.  
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In order to identify potential differences in the respective effect sizes of the fulfillment of 
shareholder and employee interests, we again applied bootstrapping to compare the 
differences in dismissal frequency between groups HDneg and HDpos with the difference in 
dismissal frequency between groups RTSneg and RTSpos. This approach allowed us to 
perform a t-test on the resulting difference in dismissal frequencies. 
In order to validate the results of our univariate tests, we applied multivariate logistic (logit) 
regression, using the existence of CFO dismissal as the dependent (dummy) variable 
(Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Denis et al., 1997; Fee & Hadlock, 2004; Volpin, 2002; Warner 
et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988). To address hypotheses H1, H2, and H3, we estimated two 
different logistic regression models for CFO dismissal, one for t-1 and the other one for t-2. 
Moreover, we specified models where we included dummy variables indicating whether RTS 
and headcount development were positive or negative, instead of using continuous variables. 
In addition to the logit models on CFO dismissal, we also fitted a multinomial logistic 
regression model (mlogit) on a sample including all identified turnover cases. This model 
showed whether a relationship between unsatisfied shareholder or employee interests and 
CFO turnover could also be established for those cases where CFO turnover was routine or 
motivated by reasons other than outright dismissal or orderly retirement. 
We tested hypothesis H4 by applying bootstrapping in a similar way as for the univariate 
analyses. However, instead of observed dismissal frequency, we focused on the predicted 
CFO dismissal probabilities from the logit model. For this purpose, we calculated the 
estimated dismissal probability for each of the four settings characterized by the two dummy 
variables for RTS and headcount development taking either the value of one or of zero, 
respectively. For each control variable, we included the mean value. Finally, to compare the 
effect sizes of RTS and headcount development on CFO dismissal probability, we again 
analyzed the predicted dismissal probabilities resulting from our bootstrapping procedure. In 
  
19
this context, we built on the results of the logit model with both RTS and headcount 
development as continuous variables. We determined the effect size of headcount 
development by comparing the predicted dismissal probabilities for its 10th and for its 90th 
percentile with all other variables, including RTS, held at their mean. Analogously, we 
determined the effect size of RTS. After bootstrapping the difference between these two effect 
sizes, we applied a t-test to assess whether it was significantly different from zero. 
RESULTS 
Univariate analyses 
Table 3 summarizes the results from our control group comparison of means and medians for 
our key variables RTS and headcount development. When testing for the relationship between 
RTS and CFO dismissal, we find both the mean and the median of RTS to be significantly 
below zero in period t-1. For t-2, we do not find RTS levels that are significantly different 
from zero. In order to test for the robustness of these results given our relatively small sample 
size, we report the respective power for each test in Table 3. For RTS in t-1, the test power 
has an acceptable level of 0.9 (Fleiss, Levin & Paik, 2003). For t-2, however, the test power is 
too low to draw robust conclusions. Overall, our findings provide support for hypothesis H1 
when focusing on RTS in the year immediately prior to the CFO replacement event, but not 
when analyzing RTS two years prior to this event. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Furthermore, we find evidence that both mean and median of the headcount development 
variable are significantly below industry average (i.e., control group-adjusted headcount is 
negative) in both years before a CFO dismissal event. This effect is stronger in t-1 than in t-2. 
Analogous to the RTS analysis, the test power for t-1 is satisfactory at levels above 0.9, 
whereas for t-2 the test does not appear to be robust. Thus, our findings for headcount 
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development in t-2 should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, we conclude that a clear 
and consistent negative relationship exists between headcount development in a particular 
year and CFO dismissal in the following year, which supports hypothesis H1. 
We also analyzed the CFO dismissal frequencies as a function of shareholder and employee 
interests, respectively.7 We find the CFO dismissal rate to be significantly higher for those 
firms with negative industry-adjusted RTS in t-1 than for those firms with positive RTS. For t-
2, we do not find a significant difference between the CFO dismissal frequencies across the 
two subsamples. For headcount development, we find clear differences between the CFO 
dismissal frequencies across the subsamples as well. For both the t-1 and t-2-analysis, the 
CFO dismissal rate is significantly higher for firms with negative headcount development than 
for firms with positive headcount development. These findings are fully in line with the 
results from the control group comparison and provide support for hypotheses H1 and H2 
with respect to t-1. 
Table 4 contains the relative and absolute CFO dismissal frequencies for each quadrant of the 
2x2-matrix differentiating between positive and negative industry-adjusted RTS and 
headcount development, respectively. At 19.2%, the relative CFO dismissal frequency is the 
highest when both RTS and headcount development are negative, while it is lowest (3.3%) 
when both of these measures are positive. With a p-value of 0.30, Fisher's exact test on the 
absolute frequencies provides no indication that the two dimensions are dependent on one 
another. Furthermore, Spearman's rank correlation coefficient on the two binary categories 
"headcount development < 0" and "industry-adjusted RTS < 0" has a value of 0.025, providing 
further support for the conclusion that the two dimensions are independent from each other. 
These findings support hypothesis H3: The negative relationship between the satisfaction of 
                                                 
7 The quantitative results are omitted here due to space constraints; they are available from the authors. 
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the interests of one party (shareholders or employees) and the likelihood of subsequent CFO 
dismissal appears to be irrespective of whether the interests of the other party are satisfied.  
Our test for complementarity between whether shareholder and employee interests are 
satisfied (hypothesis H4) does not provide evidence for a significant complementary effect. 
Although Inequality (1) holds when inserting the relative dismissal frequencies for each 
subsample shown in Table 4, there is too much variation in our bootstrapping results for the 
difference between the two terms contained in the inequality to be statistically significant. 
Therefore, we cannot confirm hypothesis H4.  
Furthermore, we find only limited evidence whether either industry-adjusted RTS or 
headcount development has a larger effect on the likelihood of CFO dismissal. In the 
univariate setting, we consider as effect size the difference between the relative CFO 
dismissal frequencies for firms with negative industry-adjusted RTS and for firms with 
positive industry-adjusted RTS.8 Consequently, RTS has an effect size of 0.062 (= 0.109 - 
0.047), i.e., it is 6.2 percentage points more likely to see the CFO be dismissed if industry-
adjusted RTS is negative than when it is positive. Analogously, the effect size of headcount 
development is 0.083 (= 0.134 - 0.051). While the latter effect appears to be slightly larger 
than the former one, the difference (calculated on the basis of bootstrapping results) is not 
statistically significant. Consequently, we do not find indication that one of the two measures 
has a stronger negative relationship with CFO dismissal than the other one. 
Insert Table 4 here 
Multivariate analyses 
Table 5 and Table 6 contain the results of our logit regressions, separately for t-1 and t-2. We 
built several, increasingly complex models. Model M1 represents the basic context model 
                                                 
8 Again, the quantitative results are omitted here due to space constraints; they are available from the authors. 
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consisting of CFO and firm-level control variables only; in models M2 through M5, we 
successively added the independent variables of interest. In addition to the logit analyses, we 
fitted a multinomial logistic regression on model M4, in order to test whether routine and 
other unforced CFO turnover are also affected by the extent to which stakeholder interests are 
fulfilled. We report the mlogit results in Table 7. 
Insert Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7 here 
We provide two widely used measures of model fit in Tables 5 through 7, McFadden's and 
Nagelkerke's pseudo-R². The results indicate that in particular our higher-order models (those 
models that go beyond the mere control variables and include the independent variables that 
are the focus of our analysis) have reasonable explanatory power. With values around 0.25 
(McFadden pseudo-R2) respectively 0.4 (Nagelkerke's pseudo-R²), the mlogit models reported 
in Table 7 appear to have particularly high explanatory power. Following Hoetker (2007), we 
also calculated prediction accuracies for our various models, which turned out to be high. For 
example, when testing the prediction accuracy of our most comprehensive model (M4) by 
comparing its share of correct predictions with a default model, we found that model M4 
reduced the prediction failure rate against the default model by 16.1 percent, a material 
reduction.9 
The regression coefficient for industry-adjusted RTS as our measure of the extent to which 
shareholder interests are fulfilled is negative and significant for t-1 (see models M2, M4, and 
M5, Table 5). Consequently, the higher RTS, the lower the probability for CFO dismissal. 
However, the regression coefficient does not significantly differ from zero in our t-2 analysis 
(see models M2, M4 and M5, Table 6). Furthermore, the mlogit analysis gives clear 
indication for a negative influence of RTS in t-1 on CFO dismissal as well, whereas the other 
two types of CFO replacement (routine replacements and the residual category “other” 
                                                 
9 A complete overview of the prediction accuracies of the various models is available from the authors. 
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replacements) do not seem to be affected by RTS: For both categories, the regression 
coefficients on industry-adjusted RTS are not significantly different from zero. Consequently, 
in line with the findings from the univariate analyses, our multivariate regressions confirm the 
negative effect of our measure for shareholder interest fulfillment on the likelihood of 
subsequent CFO dismissal, thus supporting hypothesis H1. 
Similarly, we found a negative and statistically significant effect of headcount development in 
t-1 on CFO dismissal probability (models M3 through M5, Table 5). When measured at t-2, 
the effect of headcount development on the likelihood of CFO dismissal is significant only 
when headcount development is measured as a binary variable (model M5, Table 6), but not 
when it is measured as a continuous variable (models M3 and M4, Table 6). These results are 
widely in line with the findings from the univariate analyses. They provide confirmatory 
evidence for hypothesis H2 regarding the negative effect of headcount development on CFO 
dismissal when headcount development is measured in t-1. Our logit analyses also provide 
further support for hypothesis H3, as all regression coefficients on industry-adjusted RTS and 
on headcount development in models M2 through M4 (Table 5) are statistically significant, 
irrespective of whether the other variable is included in the analysis or not. 
Furthermore, our mlogit model indicates that headcount development does not significantly 
affect routine CFO turnover. For our category of non-routine CFO replacement cases driven 
by reasons other than dismissal, the findings are less clear. While, in t-1 there is a small, only 
tentatively significant effect of headcount development on CFO replacement, we find a 
significant negative effect in t-2. From our perspective, this effect is most likely due to the 
broad variety of CFO turnover cases contained in this category. 
To facilitate a better interpretation of our findings, in Figures 1 and 2 we present graphical 
illustrations of the respective effects of industry-adjusted RTS and headcount development at 
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t-1 in model M4. Both key variables are included with original, non-standardized values, and 
all control variables are held at their mean.  
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here 
Figure 1 plots the predicted likelihood of CFO dismissal as a function of industry-adjusted 
RTS for three levels of headcount development, ranging from one standard deviation below its 
mean to one standard deviation above. Inspection of Figure 1 clearly illustrates the negative 
relationship between industry-adjusted RTS and CFO dismissal, as hypothesized (H1). The 
convex shape of the graphs indicates that the effect of RTS on dismissal probability is stronger 
for lower levels of RTS than for higher ones. This finding holds particularly true for RTS 
levels below zero. In addition, for high levels of RTS, CFO dismissal probabilities do not 
differ strongly between the three graphs relating to different levels of headcount development, 
whereas, for lower RTS values, a large spread in the predicted dismissal probabilities is 
apparent. Specifically, the predicted CFO dismissal probability reacts stronger to RTS if 
headcount development is low than when it is high.  
Figure 2 depicts forced CFO dismissal probability as a function of headcount development at 
different levels of RTS. Similar to Figure 1, CFO dismissal probability is a declining, convex 
function of headcount development, supporting hypothesis H2. For lower levels of RTS, the 
negative relationship between headcount development and CFO dismissal is particularly 
strong. These findings suggest a mutually reinforcing interaction effect between RTS and 
headcount development.  
However, further analysis shows that this interaction effect between RTS and headcount 
development is not strong enough to reach statistical significance. We tested for 
complementarity by calculating Inequality (1) using the predicted CFO dismissal probabilities 
from model M5 (Table 5). The results, presented in Table 8, show a small complementarity 
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effect of 4.0% between the effects of RTS and headcount development on the likelihood of 
CFO dismissal, but this complementarity effect is below the level, where it would reach 
statistical significance. Thus, we are not able to confirm hypothesis H4. Overall, we conclude 
from our findings that the effects of headcount development and industry-adjusted RTS on the 
probability of CFO dismissal are significant and independent from each other, but do not 
mutually reinforce each other to a significant extent. 
Insert Table 8 here 
We were also interested in the size of the effects of our key variables (industry-adjusted RTS 
and headcount development) on the likelihood of CFO dismissal. In line with Denis et al. 
(1997), Hoetker (2007), and Kang & Shivdasani (1995) we interpret marginal effects, 
calculated as the differences in predicted CFO dismissal probabilities for low and high values 
of our key variables, as effect sizes. Using the results from model M4 (Table 5), we find that a 
change in industry-adjusted RTS from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile leads to a 
decrease in CFO dismissal probability by 5.98 percentage points (from 8.45 to 2.47 percent). 
With regard to headcount development, a change from the 10th to the 90th percentile leads to 
an absolute decrease in CFO dismissal probability by 6.56 percentage points (from 8.72 to 
2.16 percent). Thus, both the absolute and the relative size of the effects of RTS and 
headcount development are almost identical, and bootstrapping suggests that any remaining 
difference is not statistically significant. Therefore, we do not have any indication that one of 
the two variables has a stronger effect on the probability of CFO dismissal than the other one. 
DISCUSSION 
Discussion of results and implications 
The goal of our study was to contribute to the stakeholder-agency literature (Hill & Jones, 
1992) by investigating whether the extent to which firms satisfy the interests of different 
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stakeholder groups affects executive dismissals as a specific form of corporate governance 
decisions. Specifically, we focus on the interests of shareholders and employees, the two 
stakeholder groups considered most important in the governance literature (e.g., Rock & 
Wachter, 1999). In the light of the potentially diverging interests of shareholders and 
employees, the CFO holds a particularly delicate position (Mian, 2001). We argue that, if a 
firm’s failure to satisfy the interests of employees is followed by strong sanctions in the form 
of CFO dismissal, the use of this mechanism by the firm’s governance bodies provides a clear 
indication that attention is being paid to employee interests.  
Our univariate and multivariate analyses provide support for this argument. We find a 
significant negative relationship between a firm’s headcount development – our proxy for the 
extent to which employee interests are fulfilled – and CFO dismissal, confirming hypothesis 
H2. In line with extant literature (Fee & Hadlock, 2004; Mian, 2001), the extent to which 
shareholder interests are fulfilled also exerts a strong, negative effect on the likelihood of 
CFO dismissal, consistent with hypothesis H1. These two effects exist independently from 
one another, confirming hypothesis H3. Overall, we interpret our results regarding the effects 
of the extent to which both shareholder and employee interests are satisfied on CFO dismissal 
as implying that both stakeholder groups hold power to affect corporate governance decisions. 
Both effects appear to materialize within about a year, calculated from the time at which 
stakeholder interests are being satisfied or not. The effects of shareholder interests and those 
of employee interests appear to be of similar magnitude. Both effects are particularly strong in 
situations where a firm does not only leave stakeholder interests unfulfilled, but clearly 
dissatisfies them (i.e., they are stronger in situations where shareholder returns and headcount 
development, respectively, are negative, rather than low but positive; see Figures 1 and 2). 
Our findings, however, do not provide a clear indication for a statistically significant 
complementarity between the two effects, and, thus, we have to reject hypothesis H4.  
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Our study has implications for the corporate governance literature in that it provides empirical 
evidence that, in addition to investors, other stakeholder groups play an important role in 
governance decisions. From our perspective, the resources that employees hold directly or 
indirectly (e.g., by influencing the firm’s perceived legitimacy) provide them with a power 
base through which important corporate decisions are influenced in their favor (Coff, 1999; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995), even if their formal representation in corporate 
governance bodies is less strong than the one of shareholders.  
Moreover, our study has implications for business practice. Our findings represent a clear 
signal to CFOs, and potentially other executives, that they have to consider the interests of 
multiple stakeholder groups when setting priorities and objectives for their firm. CFOs, and 
presumably other executives in top-level positions, must balance the interests and objectives 
of multiple parties if they wish to secure their position. 
Limitations and directions for further research 
Our study has several limitations, of which we highlight two that we consider particularly 
important. First, despite an extensive literature review we were unable to find an established 
measure for the extent to which a company fulfills its employees’ interests. Therefore, we had 
to rely on headcount development as a proxy for employees’ interests. The scope of our study 
did not allow us to systematically validate alternative measures for capturing employee 
interests. Consequently, we derived our proxy from theoretical considerations in the 
governance literature. In this literature, job security and adequate remuneration are described 
as vital workforce interests (e.g., Blair & Roe, 1999). We argue that job security is the more 
reliable measure in our context, due to its existential importance for many employees, and its 
clear observability. From our perspective, a systematic validation of alternative measures of 
employee interests calls for further research.  
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Second, when compared to previous publications dealing with executive turnover in the U.S., 
the size of our sample is relatively small, due to the limited number of large listed companies 
in Germany. The two leading indices of listed companies, which we used to build our sample, 
contain only 80 firms in total, reflecting the comparatively limited role of the stock market in 
Germany as compared to the U.S. We deliberately chose not to inflate the size of our sample 
by including smaller firms than those considered in the respective indices or by extending the 
period of investigation, as doing so might have adversely affected data reliability. Publicly 
available data on smaller firms tends to be less comprehensive and less reliable. The sample 
size issue, however, represents an inevitable caveat researchers are facing in many countries 
outside large markets with a homogenous legal and governance structure, such as the U.S. 
Apart from redressing these issues, we believe that our study calls for future research in 
particular with respect to the role of the institutional setting. Clearly, our study is 
characterized by its focus on the German corporate governance system with its relatively 
weak focus on shareholder rights as compared to some other countries (Fauver & Fuerst, 
2006; Franks & Mayer, 1990). We find this feature reflected in the deviation of our results 
from previous studies in the U.S. and the U.K., which find an even stronger relationship 
between shareholder returns and executive turnover (Denis et al., 1997; Mian, 2001). 
According to the German Codetermination Act, employees are strongly represented in the 
supervisory boards of firms – in particular in those with more than 2,000 employees – 
although they do not hold the voting majority. Our study does not allow us to assess in what 
way the legal setting affects the extent to which top managers need to take employee interests 
into account. Hence this issue calls for further comparative research (Gospel & Pendleton, 
2005). However, we submit that our underlying theoretical rationale for the importance of 
employee interests, which draws on resource-dependency and legitimacy theory, is 
independent from legislation. 
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TABLE 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
  Whole sample (n=797)  Turnover firm years (n=119) 
 
10th 
percentile Median 
90th 
percentile 
10th 
percentile Median 
90th 
percentile 
Total assets (EUR m)  364 1,797 35,011 360 1,763 30,251
Number of 
employees  
2,407 12,859 107,856 3,013 13,889 114,952
Log of market value 
of equity  
5.18 6.94 9.84 3.94 6.91 9.61
Book-to-market ratio  0.19 0.52 1.14 0.16 0.49 1.00
Revenue Growth  -.11 0.06 0.24 -0.18 0.04 0.35
Debt-to-equity ratio  0.80 2.20 5.22 0.87 2.48 7.21
Note. Contains all cases of CFO turnover in the 121 largest German corporations between 1999 and 2006, 
adjusted for double replacements within one year, CFO installation with no outgoing CFO and cases coinciding 
with IPO, delisting, merger, or bankruptcy. A correlation table is available from the authors upon request.  
TABLE 2  
Distribution of CFO Turnover Events across Years and Industries 
Year Number 
of 
Turnover 
Events 
Turnover 
rate per 
year 
 Industry Number 
of 
Turnover 
Events 
Turnover 
rate per 
industry 
1999 20 17.5% Basic Materials 9 11.4%
2000 16 15.5% Industrials 44 14.4%
2001 11 10.3% Consumer Goods 31 13.8%
2002 13 13.0% Health Care 8 10.4%
2003 17 17.2% Consumer Services 21 17.6%
2004 14 15.2% Telecommunications 2 15.4%
2005 11 12.1% Utilities 2 8.0%
2006 17 18.1% Technology 2 8.0%
Total 119 Total 119 
Note. Contains all cases of CFO turnover in the 121 largest German corporations between 1999 and 2006, 
adjusted for double replacements within one year, CFO installation with no outgoing CFO and cases coinciding 
with IPO, delisting, merger, or bankruptcy. 
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TABLE 3  
CFO dismissals: Mean and median comparison tests 
 Time (t-1) (n=33) Time (t-2) (n=28) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Industry-adjusted RTS -0.2018
(0.0030)
[0.8951]
*** -0.2199
(0.0055)
*** -0.0694
(0.3153)
[0.1759]
 -0.0253
(0.3504)
 
Adjusted Headcount Development -0.08908
(0.0022)
[0.9150]
*** -0.0588
(0.0046)
*** -0.0577
(0.0495)
[0.5385]
** -0.0488
(0.0876)
* 
Note. The levels of significance are determined using t-tests (Wilcoxon Sign-Rank tests) for means (medians). p-
values reported in parentheses, test power in brackets. 
*, **, and *** denote significance levels for two-tailed tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
TABLE 4  
Matrix of CFO dismissal rates by positive vs. negative industry-adjusted RTS and 
headcount development 
Absolute number of CFO dismissal events  
 Time t-1 Time t-2 
 RTS < 0 RTS ≥ 0 RTS < 0 RTS ≥ 0 
Headcount development < 0 I 14 II 5 I 10 II 6 
Headcount development ≥ 0 III 10 IV 4 III 7 IV 5 
Relative CFO dismissal frequencies   
 Time t-1  Time t-2 
 RTS < 0 RTS ≥ 0 RTS < 0 RTS ≥ 0 
Headcount development < 0 I 19.2% II 8.5% I 12.9% II 9.7% 
Headcount development ≥ 0 III 7.8% IV 3.3% III 5.1% IV 3.8% 
Complementarity coefficient 
according to Equation (1) 
6.2%
(0.317)  
Note. The four quadrants of the matrix, numbered I to IV, denote the following subsamples: I) RTSnegHDneg, 
II) RTSposHDneg, III) RTSnegHDpos, IV) RTSposHDpos. Complementarity coefficient calculated by solving 
Inequality (1) for zero and bootstrapping the resulting term. p-value in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote significance levels for two-tailed tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 5  
Results of Logit Analyses for t-1 
Logit Regression Coefficients M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Industry-adjusted RTS  -0.620
(0.015)
**  -0.573
(0.025)
**  
Headcount Development   -0.651
(0.006)
*** -0.612
(0.009)
***  
Dummy variable indicating negative 
industry-adjusted RTS 
    0.837
(0.070)
* 
 
Dummy variable indicating negative 
headcount development 
    0.940
(0.027)
** 
Debt-to-equity Ratio 0.878
(0.000)
*** 0.753
(0.000)
*** 0.756
(0.000)
*** 0.663
(0.002)
*** 0.697
(0.001)
***
Finance -0.279
(0.524)
 -0.455
(0.317)
 -0.105
(0.818)
 -0.288
(0.540)
 -0.321
(0.477)
 
CFO Age 0.093
(0.666)
 0.103
(0.637)
 0.016
(0.945)
 0.027
(0.904)
 0.065
(0.772)
 
Share of Institutional Investors -0.120
(0.564)
 -0.080
(0.705)
 -0.177
(0.411)
 -0.136
(0.536)
 -0.150
(0.490)
 
Firm Size -0.432
(0.060)
* -0.319
(0.165)
 -0.496
(0.036)
** -0.376
(0.112)
 -0.430
(0.059)
* 
Constant -3.674
(0.000)
*** -3.757
(0.000)
*** -3.803
(0.000)
*** -3.891
(0.000)
*** -4.483
(0.000)
***
Number of observations 384 384 384 384 384 
Pseudo-R² (McFadden) 0.124 0.155 0.164 0.190 0.165 
Pseudo-R² (Nagelkerke) 0.156 0.194 0.204 0.235 0.205 
Note. In order to improve comparability of coefficients, the variables were standardized. p-values are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote significance levels for two-tailed tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 6  
Results of Logit Analyses for t-2 
Logit Regression Coefficients M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Industry-adjusted RTS  -0.302
(0.216)
  -0.304
(0.218)
  
Headcount Development   -0.333
(0.182)
 -0.337
(0.183)
  
Dummy variable indicating negative 
industry-adjusted RTS 
    0.394
(0.401)
 
 
Dummy variable indicating negative 
headcount development 
    1.080
(0.022)
** 
Debt-to-equity Ratio 0.816
(0.000)
*** 0.762
(0.001)
*** 0.777
(0.001)
*** 0.726
(0.002)
*** 0.673
(0.004)
***
Finance -1.184
(0.049)
** -1.270
(0.038)
** -0.995
(0.103)
 -1.074
(0.084)
* -1.039
(0.089)
* 
CFO Age -0.088
(0.697)
 -0.071
(0.756)
 0.120
(0.604)
 -0.098
(0.672)
 -0.104
(0.657)
 
Share of Institutional Investors -0.242
(0.295)
 -0.222
(0.342)
 -0.251
(0.280)
 -0.231
(0.323)
 -0.281
(0.244)
 
Firm Size -0.323
(0.205)
 -0.291
(0.249)
 -0.360
(0.164)
 -0.327
(0.202)
 -0.341
(0.180)
 
Constant -4.118
(0.000)
*** -4.137
(0.000)
*** -4.152
(0.000)
*** -4.185
(0.000)
*** -4.750
(0.000)
***
Number of observations 378 378 378 378 378 
Pseudo-R² (McFadden) 0.144 0.153 0.154 0.163 0.179 
Pseudo-R² (Nagelkerke) 0.175 0.186 0.187 0.198 0.217 
Note. In order to improve comparability of coefficients, the variables were standardized. p-values are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote significance levels for two-tailed tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 7  
Results of Mlogit analyses 
 t-1 t-2 
Logit Regression Coefficients Routine  Forced  Other  Routine  Forced  Other  
Industry-adjusted RTS 0.227
(0.529)
 -0.578
(0.018)
** -0.006
(0.966)
 -0.431
(0.214)
 -0.293
(0.227)
 -0.188
(0.237)
 
Headcount Development -0.482
(0.150)
 -0.605
(0.007)
*** -0.276
(0.094)
* -0.271
(0.468)
 -0.319
(0.185)
 -0.531
(0.002)
***
Debt-to-equity Ratio -0.552
(0.239)
 0.701
(0.000)
*** 0.350
(0.020)
** -0.802
(0.067)
* 0.754
(0.000)
*** 0.245
(0.171)
 
Finance 0.332
(0.624)
 -0.185
(0.690)
 0.210
(0.501)
 -0.348
(0.573)
 -1.078
(0.086)
* 0.051
(0.888)
 
CFO Age 7.232
(0.000)
*** 0.058
(0.810)
 -0.197
(0.226)
 4.860
(0.000)
*** -0.070
(0.778)
 -0.439
(0.012)
** 
Share of Institutional Investors 0.308
(0.439)
 -0.089
(0.671)
 -0.016
(0.966)
 -0.040
(0.903)
 -0.211
(0.350)
 0.071
(0.644)
 
Firm Size 0.355
(0.353)
 -0.306
(0.165)
 -0.163
(0.297)
 0.032
(0.917)
 -0.312
(0.206)
 -0.185
(0.300)
 
Constant -11.728
(0.000)
*** -3.894
(0.000)
*** -1.679
(0.000)
*** -8.632
(0.000)
*** -4.061
(0.000)
*** -2.398
(0.000)
***
Number of observations 476 458 
Pseudo-R² (McFadden) 0.260 0.240 
Pseudo-R² (Nagelkerke) 0.436 0.395 
Note. In order to improve comparability of coefficients, the variables were standardized. p-values are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote significance levels for two-tailed tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 8  
Complementarity test based on bootstrapped logit results for t-1 
Predicted probabilities of CFO dismissal Time t-1 [n=384] 
 Industry-adjusted  RTS < 0 
Industry-adjusted  
RTS ≥ 0 
 Headcount development < 0 I 14.1% II 7.1% 
 Headcount development ≥ 0 III 5.7% IV 2.7% 
 Complementarity coefficient  according to Inequality (1) 
4.0%
(0.186)   
Note. The four quadrants of the matrix, numbered I to IV, denote the following subsamples: I) RTSnegHDneg, 
II) RTSposHDneg, III) RTSnegHDpos, IV) RTSposHDpos. Complementarity coefficient calculated by solving 
Inequality (1) for zero and bootstrapping the resulting term. p-value in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote significance levels for two-tailed tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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FIGURE 1  
Predicted Turnover Probability by industry-adjusted RTS for model M4 in t-1, all other 
measures held at mean 
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FIGURE 2  
Predicted Turnover Probability by headcount development for model M4 in t-1, all 
other measures held at mean 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
P
re
di
ct
ed
 T
ur
no
ve
r P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Headcount Development
Industry-adjusted RTS = Mean - 1 Standard Deviation
Industry-adjusted RTS = Mean
Industry-adjusted RTS = Mean + 1 Standard Deviation
 
